I want to renew
2019/12/31 08:56:22 Source: Yimeng2019 / 12/31 08:56:22
In the past two days, another medical white horse stock burst, and Furen Pharmaceutical has opened a limit mode.
Until July 22, Furen Pharmaceutical's investors did not receive the company's previously promised 62.715 million cash dividends. According to the original plan, cash dividends should have been paid on this day.
The company failed to pay dividends as scheduled, and the company explained that it was due to "funding arrangements." But this statement is not only accepted by investors, but also by regulators.
Furen Pharmaceutical had RMB 1.816 billion in monetary funds as of the end of March. However, the evening announcement on July 24 showed that as of July 19, its book currency funds were only 127 million yuan-nearly 1.7 billion yuan of huge funds disappeared out of thin air.
Although the reasons for the disappearance of Furen Pharmaceutical's monetary funds are unknown at this time, listed companies' billions or even tens of billions of cash disappears, which is nothing new in the A-share market. Prior to Furen Pharmaceutical, there was a precedent: in January 2019, * ST Kangde, with a book value of 15 billion yuan in cash, was unable to pay 1.5 billion yuan of bonds due. At the end of April, ST Kangmei wiped out nearly 30 billion yuan of funds.
Huge amounts of funds of listed companies frequently disappear, often behind the consequences of illegal shareholders' illegal occupation. As early as November 2006, the CSRC issued a special document requesting the liquidation of listed companies' funds by major shareholders. After a lapse of more than ten years, the situation of illegal shareholders' occupation by major shareholders has not disappeared, but has made a comeback again, and the amount has become huge.
Compared with the past, the means by which the major shareholders and actual controllers occupy the funds of listed companies is also a retrofit. In addition to traditional direct occupancy, connected transactions, and illegal guarantees, high-premium outbound investment mergers and acquisitions, carefully designed scams and excessive dividends through wealth management investments have become variants of the use of listed company funds, and direct occupancy and illegal guarantees. There are also new moves.
Combining multiple previous cases, it has been found that there are six main ways for the company's major shareholders to occupy funds to empty listed companies:
I. Direct occupation
The sudden performance of Furen Pharmaceuticals shocked the regulators. The SSE subsequently issued an inquiry letter asking Furen Pharmaceuticals to explain the reasons for the failure to transfer the cash dividends on schedule, the process of processing, and whether there are liquidity difficulties in the balance of funds, and verify whether the controlling shareholders and actual controllers have occupied funds. , Illegal guarantees, etc.
Furen Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. responded in the evening on July 24 that, as of July 19, 2019, the total cash owned by the company and its subsidiaries was only 122.24 million yuan, of which the restricted amount was 132.36 million yuan and the unrestricted amount was 3.787 million yuan. The original plan was to pay dividends from dividends obtained from subsidiaries, but due to the pressure of funds, in order to ensure daily operations, capital arrangements were not in place in a timely manner.
Another huge amount of money is missing.
The consolidated financial report shows that as of the end of March 2019, Furen Pharmaceutical has a book currency of 1.816 billion yuan and an undistributed profit of 2.998 billion yuan. But as to why nearly 1.7 billion yuan of funds suddenly disappeared, the company said it needed to verify further.
Furen Pharmaceutical's huge capital is yet to be further explained by the company. In terms of the amount involved, the supervision of ST Kangmei and * ST Kangde, which have previously announced clear conclusions, is the actual controller and major shareholders occupying the funds of the listed company. For a typical case.
On April 29, ST Kangmei, which has been questioned for a long time, suddenly adjusted the "accounting errors" and reduced the balance of monetary funds at the end of 2017 from 34.15 billion yuan to 4.201 billion yuan. Nearly 30 billion yuan of funds were "erased" out of thin air. The investigation results notified by the Securities and Futures Commission on May 17 showed that of these disappeared funds, nearly 8.9 billion yuan went to related parties in the form of other advance payments, and the funds were used to buy and sell ST Kangmei stock.
As the major shareholder of * ST Kangde, Kangde Group will use the form of unified management of bank accounts of its affiliated companies, and from 2014 to 2018, the amount will be 6.523 billion yuan, 5.837 billion yuan, 7.672 billion yuan, 17.15 billion yuan, 159.31 Funds of the listed company system of 100 million yuan were collected into the group account.
As Baima stocks with a market value of 100 billion yuan, the major shareholders of ST Kangmei and * ST Kangde have received much more attention than the listed companies.
In addition to prepayments and collection of funds, other cases of major shareholders occupying listed company funds through other means are common.
The * ST guarantees exposed at the end of 2017 involved as much as 7.3 billion yuan in occupation and transfer, and a considerable part of the funds was the occupation of the funds led by the actual controller.
Zhuang Min, the actual controller of the company at that time, transferred funds of the listed company by means of accounts receivable, prepayment, etc. By the end of 2017, the company's account receivable balance reached 2.627 billion yuan, accounting for 55.2% of the 2016 net assets, and Most of the accounts receivables involve many customers. The business ability and repayment ability are in doubt. There is uncertainty about whether the subsequent accounts receivable can be recovered. Prepayments and other receivables are 1.509 billion yuan, accounting for 2016. With 34.49% of net assets, the risk of non-recovery is large, and the company made provision for bad debt impairment of RMB 3.479 billion.
In order to conceal the fact that major shareholders occupy, some major shareholders of listed companies also use third-party transfers to disguise the direct related capital occupation as non-associated occupation.
According to Tianxiang Environmental Disclosure, from January 1 to July 17, 2018, the company transferred a total of 2.164 billion yuan to Chengdu Zhengqi Machinery Equipment Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Chengdu Zhengqi"), and Chengdu Zhengqi subsequently transferred the funds The entity controlled or designated by Deng Qinhua, the actual controller of the company. During the same period, the company also transferred 31 million yuan to another enterprise, and the funds were also transferred to Chengdu Zhengqi, which eventually flowed into the main body controlled by Deng Qinhua.
* ST Shengda is in the form of signing a loan contract with natural persons. After three natural persons obtain loans, the funds are immediately transferred to the account of the company's controlling shareholder Shengda Group.
In addition, there are some controlling shareholders of listed companies who borrow in the name of listed companies and eventually occupy them. ST Shin Kong (002147.SZ) disclosed on June 28 that its controlling shareholder did not fulfill the corresponding internal approval decision-making procedures, borrowed and was occupied by the company in the name of the company, amounting to 1.454 billion.
Second, new rules for illegal guarantees
At the same time of direct occupation, many major shareholders of listed companies provide guarantees in the name of listed companies without the disclosure of the listed company's decision-making or fulfillment of the decision, often amounting to several billion yuan.
* ST Conder is just that. In addition to the occupancy formed in the name of capital collection, the company also has a situation of illegal guarantees. The notice of supervision and punishment shows that from January 2016 to September 2018, * ST Kangde subsidiary Zhangjiagang Kangde New Optoelectronic Materials Co., Ltd. signed a contract with Xiamen International Bank and AVIC Trust to fund a large amount of special funds for optoelectronic materials Deposit certificate, guarantee for Kangde Group.
There is also ST Shin Kong. The company disclosed on June 17 that as of the end of December 2018, the guarantees that had not been prosecuted were overdue, and the total amount reached 3.61 billion yuan. As of June 28, the amount of illegal guarantees still reached 3.057 billion yuan.
* ST Gangtai's violation guarantee amount is even greater. The announcement in May and September showed that from November 2016 to June 2018, in the case of failure to perform the corresponding decision and letter, the company provided loan guarantees for the actual controller, controlling shareholder and parties acting in concert, etc. Amounted to 4.277 billion yuan.
From the perspective of post-disclosure, a considerable number of illegal guarantees were led by major shareholders and were not reported afterwards. ST Shin Kong stated in the announcement that its controlling shareholder and its affiliates had stamped the company's official seal on the letter of guarantee, guarantee contract, etc. without performing the approval decision-making procedures, which caused the company to violate the guarantee.
Shenwu Environmental Protection also disclosed on May 23 that from 2015, July 2017 to January 2018, the company was the controlling shareholder Shenwu Technology Group and Its subsidiaries provided guarantees for loans, with a cumulative amount of about 1 billion yuan.
In the form of illegal guarantees, in addition to the traditional joint and several liability guarantee, new financial instruments and actual assets have become tools for some illegal acts. For example, * ST Kangde, its subsidiary provides guarantee for the Kangde Group, which is to use a large amount of account deposit certificates as a tool to perform the guarantee.
In addition, Shengda Group loaned RMB 500 million in Xiamen International Bank in July 2017, and was secured by a regular deposit certificate pledged by * ST Shengda subsidiary Guizhou Zhonghongda Energy Co., Ltd. In May 2018, Shengda Group defaulted, and the 500 million yuan deposit certificate pledged by Guizhou Zhonghong was used for repayment.
Concealment of related party transactions
Compared with direct illegal and illegal occupation, some listed company's major shareholders occupy the listed company's funds even more covertly through daily transactions and mergers and acquisitions. De-associating related transactions has become a new means for major shareholders and actual controllers of listed companies to occupy funds.
The July 23 announcement showed that due to failure to make payment according to the time specified in the court's execution notice, * ST Suoling, its subsidiary Guangdong Suoling Electronic Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Guangdong Suoling”), and the actual controller Xiao Xingye were also Shenzhen The Intermediate People's Court was included in the list of people who had breached trust and was issued a consumption restriction order.
So far, the company has involved at least four factoring financing disputes. In March 2019, Moshan was awarded RMB 500 million in factoring financing to Shanghai Moshan Commercial Factoring Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Moshan Factoring") and its affiliated company Horgos Commercial Factoring. Factoring applied for compulsory enforcement, and this time was included in the list of untrustworthy people, the direct reason is this commercial factoring. Since June, three commercial factoring companies have sued for * ST Suoling and Guangdong Suoling. According to the disclosure, in the above lawsuit, the factoring financing amounts involved were 15.73 million yuan, 40 million yuan, and 45 million yuan.
The auditor stated in the audit opinion of * ST Suoling's 2018 annual report that as of the end of December 2018, * ST Suoling, its subsidiaries Jiujiang Miaoshiku Industrial Co., Ltd., and Guangdong Suoling passed factoring financing, and then in the name of Soling , To Xiangshan Guzhen Ruike Plastic Hardware Electrical Appliance Factory (hereinafter referred to as "Guzhen Ruike"), Zhongshan Chuanghuida Electronics Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Chuanghuida Electronics"), Shenzhen Longrui Plastic Electronics Co., Ltd. ( (Hereinafter referred to as "Longrui Plastic"), Jianghai Chuanghuida Electronic Appliance Factory and other companies, paying in the form of prepayment, other receivables, etc., with a total amount of 1.076 billion yuan. These capital transactions should be traced back to 2017.
China Business News reported in April 2019 that among the above four companies, the minimum registered capital was only RMB 80,000, and the largest was only RMB 1 million. * ST Soling announced in December 2018 that it did not find any relationship between the above three suppliers, their shareholders and senior management and the company.
However, the company's second largest shareholder found that Long Rui Plastic, Guzhen Ruike, and Chuanghuida Electronics were also related to Xiao Xing. Among them, Deng Zhuan, the younger brother of Xiao Xingyi and the spouse of Xiao Xingjie, a shareholder of Soling shares, and Gu Hua, an investor in Ruike, Guzhen, are all investors in a limited partnership. Deng Zhuan is also a shareholder of Chuanghuida Electronics; The contact phone number and email address of Long Rui Plastic's 2016 and 2017 annual reports are the same as the one-man company Shenzhen Xiaoling Technology Co., Ltd., also named by Xiao Xing.
After querying Qixinbao, it was found that in addition to Chuanghuida Electronics, the contact information and shareholder information in the industrial and commercial information of Ruike, Longrui Plastic, and Jiujiang Xingyuan in Zhonggu Town were in accordance with those described by Zhongshan Lexing, but Chuanghuida Electronics Among shareholders, Deng did not transfer.
* The same is true for ST Pegasus. According to the announcement on April 4, in 2017 and 2018, the actual controller and related parties of the company occupied the company's funds with suspicious commercial transactions, resulting in the company's actual loss of 2.379 billion yuan. In addition to the potential loss estimates, the formation of controlling shareholders and shareholders The actual controller's credit amount was 804 million yuan, with a total amount of 3.18 billion yuan.
* The announcement released by ST Tianma on March 13 shows that on December 26 and 29, 2017, it signed 13 contracts with Shenzhen Oriental Boyu Trading Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Orient Boyu") to Dongfang Boyu Purchase of steel, machinery and equipment. Within three days after the contract was signed, * ST Tianma prepaid the entire 666 million yuan purchase.
In February 2018, * ST Tianma signed a supplementary agreement with Oriental Boyu on 11 of these contracts, stipulating that 566.6 million yuan of the purchase price should be delivered by September 30, 2018. On September 5th of that year, * ST Tianma requested Dongfang Boyu to cancel the contract and refund 660 million yuan of funds. But as of the disclosure date, Oriental Boyu neither delivered nor refunded.
* ST Tianma's post-mortem investigation concluded that Oriental Boyu and its controlling shareholder Kashi Xinghe Venture Capital Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Kash Xinghe”) and the actual controller Xu Maodong did not have an associated relationship and could not determine whether they acted in concert. However, Kashi Xinghe confirmed that the above funds had flowed into Kashi Xinghe and other commercial entities controlled by Xu Maodong, and Oriental Boyu had a special interest relationship with Kashi Xinghe and Xu Maodong.
In addition to daily transactions, related party acquisitions are also a major means for large shareholders to occupy listed companies. On March 13, 2019, * ST Tianma cancelled five transactions in one go, four of which were related to related transactions.
According to the disclosure, from August to December 2017, * ST Tianma's subsidiary Hangzhou Tianma Xinghe Investment Partnership (Limited Partnership) (hereinafter referred to as "Tianma Xinghe"), its subsidiary Kashi Yaozhuo Venture Capital Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Kashi "Yao Zhuo"), Beijing Xinghe Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Xinghe Intelligent"), with 350 million yuan, 100 million yuan, 150 million yuan, and 750 million yuan respectively, in the form of acquisition, capital increase, and establishment, etc. Let and increase capital to Hangzhou Top Rice Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Hangzhou Top Rice"), Beijing Tianruixiaguang Technology Development Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Tianruixiaguang"), Beijing Xueyun Investment Management Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Beijing "Xueyun") 45.4545%, 3.23%, 45% equity, and about 49% of the equity investment of an equity investment management partnership.
After the investigation, it was found that the funds of the above equity investment partnership were 733 million yuan for acquiring 100% equity of Beijing Xinghe Space Technology Group Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Xinghe Space") and 10 million yuan for acquiring Gewu Zhicheng (Beijing) Information Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Gewu Zhicheng”) 16.37% equity. The counterparties that acquired the two companies are related parties of Xu Maodong, the actual controller.
The audit agency also found that Tianruixiaguang ’s e-mail suffix was consistent with a Beijing-registered company controlled by Xu Maodong, and no reasonable explanation was found that Tianruixia and Xu Maodong did not have an associated relationship. * ST Tianma therefore determined that Tianrui Xiaguang and one of its shareholders, Li Shenguo, used the related party's funds for the company's major shareholders.
In the announcement on March 13, the board of directors of * ST Tianma believed that when acquiring Hangzhou Topmi and Beijing Xueyun, whether the transaction counterparty and the two companies themselves had an associated relationship with the company's controlling shareholder and Xu Maodong, although it was impossible to judge, It should be recognized that there is a special interest relationship between the counterparty and Xu Maodong.
4. Blood draw for mergers and acquisitions
In recent years, with the rise of outbound M & A and investment, outbound investment and M & A have also become new means for major shareholders of listed companies to occupy and embezzle funds. This has been the case for * ST Bao Qian, * ST Kaidi, and Zhuhai Zhongfu, which have been suspended from listing.
In August 2012, the board of directors of Zhuhai Zhongfu decided to acquire the minority shareholders' equity of 46 holding subsidiaries of the listed company held by Beverage Packaging Investment Limited (hereinafter referred to as "BPI") and 2 indirectly held grand companies for 885 million yuan. .
At the time, the counterparty BPI was also controlled by CVC Capital Partners Asia II Limited (hereinafter referred to as "CVC"). Prior to the acquisition, the above target companies had been controlled by Zhuhai Zhongfu, and 19 of them were in a loss state. After adjustment, Zhuhai Zhongfu still acquired these target assets for 590 million yuan.
After the completion of the acquisition, Zhuhai Zhongfu's performance not only failed to reverse the trend, but also suffered losses for years. On May 28, 2015, Zhuhai Zhongfu's bond "12 Zhongfu 01" only paid the interest of the current bond of 31.152 million yuan in full, and failed to pay the principal in full, constituting a substantial default.
Prior to the acquisition, Zhuhai Zhongfu's capital was OK. Data show that as of the end of September 2012, the company's book currency balance was 1.149 billion yuan. By the end of March 2015, only 494 million yuan remained in its book currency. One year ago, after completing the asset sale and cashing out, CVC transferred its shares and left the market.
If it is said that the acquisition of Zhuhai Zhongfu is also of a connected transaction nature, then the multi-billion-dollar fund occupation and transfer in the name of foreign investment, led by * ST Baoqian actual controller Zhuang Min, is more typical. .
On September 4, 2017, without warning, HSBC Shenzhen Branch suddenly froze * ST Baoqian's fixed increase of 72.728 million yuan in capital. Then Ping An Bank Shenzhen Branch quickly followed up and frozen some * ST Baosteel. Thousands of funds and real estate. On December 2, 2017, * ST Baoqian defaulted on the principal and interest of 72 million yuan of bonds due to cash flow shortage.
* ST Baoqian later announced that Zhuang Min, the actual controller and the former chairman, was suspected of infringing the interests of listed companies on the grounds of illegal guarantees, large receivables transactions, large prepayments transactions, and purchases of assets by foreign investment This will cause significant losses to the company.
In March 2015, after the backdoor * ST Zhongda went public, under the leadership of Zhuang Min, * ST Baoqian began a large-scale ecological layout, and through a large number of external investments and acquisitions, transformed into VR, robotics, and artificial intelligence. According to media reports, the company once formed a strategic partnership with LeTV.
According to the 2016 annual report data, as of the end of 2016, the balance of * ST Baoqian's foreign equity investment reached 2.2 billion yuan, an increase of nearly 2 billion yuan over the previous year. In the first half of 2017, its external equity investment also reached 1.99 billion yuan, with a total amount of nearly 4.2 billion yuan.
According to the disciplinary decision issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange in December 2018, Zhuang Min led the company to invest in Shenzhen Loutongbao Industrial Co., Ltd. and Shenzhen Anweike Electronics Co., Ltd. from 2016 to 2017, with a total investment of approximately 3.275 billion. RMB, accounting for 74.86% of the company's audited net assets in 2016. Except for two of the companies, as of April 28, 2018, the operations of other companies were in a state of halt, which resulted in * ST Baoqian accruing long-term equity investment impairment provisions of approximately 2.986 billion yuan, and accruing goodwill impairment 793 million yuan.
V. New variants of financial investment
In recent years, various types of asset management products that have become popular have also become new variants of listed companies' "empty" listed companies, and similar examples have emerged endlessly.
The Hubei Securities Regulatory Commission's decision on administrative supervision measures issued on June 14th shows that since December 2017, China Pearl Medical Care has issued to China Pearl Group and its subsidiaries through the purchase of trust products, provision of financial leases, payment of deposits, and issuance of commercial acceptance bills. Stakeholder funding.
The announcement disclosed on June 20 shows that in April 2018, in the name of trust financing, Zhongzhu Medical issued two 300 million yuan loans to subsidiaries controlled by Zhongzhu Group; Hengqin Zhongzhu Finance, a subsidiary of Zhongzhu Medical The leasing company signed a financial lease contract with a hospital, but the latter defaulted. It was determined afterwards that the hospital involved was actually controlled by the two shareholders of Zhongzhu Medical. In addition, Zhongzhu Leasing also loaned 310 million yuan to non-affiliated companies in 2018, and the funds finally flowed into the controlling shareholder Zhongzhu Group.
Compared with Zhongzhu Medical, the actual controller of Zangge Holdings is more hidden. According to the disclosure, in December 2018, without the approval of the board of directors and the shareholders' general meeting, Shanghai Zangxiang Trading Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Shanghai Zangxiang”), a wholly-owned sun company of Zangge Holdings, utilized the customer ’s Shenzhen Aeon Sihai Trading Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "AEON Four Seas"), Shenzhen Zhenshitong Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Zhenshitongke"), and supplier Shenzhen Xingye Fidelity Supply Chain Management Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Xingye Fidelity") ") And other recoverable receivables and returned advance payments, totaling 1.8 billion yuan, were used to purchase the right to the asset management products. The underlying assets of the asset management product came from the above-mentioned parts and suppliers of Shanghai Zangxiang, and the funds eventually flowed into the hands of the majority shareholder of Zangge Holdings.
* ST Huaye, which invested heavily in receivables and was eventually deceived, not only lacked transparency in its business process, but also involved a more alarming scale of funds.
* ST Huaye disclosed in September 2018 that its investment of RMB 880 million in accounts receivable had overdue claims. Subsequent investigation revealed that the overdue receivables' claims were fictitious and the seals and bills were forged by Chongqing Hengyun Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Hengyun Pharmaceutical”). At that time, its stock of accounts receivable investment amounted to 10.189 billion yuan, all of which were acquired from Hengyun Pharmaceutical.
Although Hengyun Pharmaceutical is not controlled by the * ST Huaye major shareholder, it is an enterprise under the name of its second largest shareholder, Li Shilin. In early 2015, * ST Huaye acquired Chongqing Jieer Medical Equipment Co., Ltd. controlled by Li Shilin for a cash consideration of 2.15 billion yuan. In addition to the subsequent transfer of some shares, Li Shilin and his affiliates held up to 15.33% of the shares of * ST Huaye.
Today, * ST Huaye is on the verge of delisting. As of the close of July 24, * ST Huaye closed at 0.98 yuan, again falling below the face value, and since June 6, * ST Huaye has fallen below the face value three times. As of the end of March, the company was insolvent and its net assets were -126 million yuan.
Six, excessive dividends lead to blood loss
In addition to illegal occupation, guarantees, acquisitions, financial investment, etc., cash dividends, as a way of returning investors, have also become a means for large shareholders to draw blood and empty out listed companies.
In the early years, Hainan Haiyao suffered a loss in performance due to excessive dividends. In 2007, the company had granted 20 million shares of stock options to employees including eight executives and some technical backbones. Among them, 8 executives obtained 8.85 million shares of the company.
In March 2018, Hainan Haiyao announced that due to the implementation of equity incentives, according to the then accounting standards and preliminary calculations by the financial department, the cost of equity instruments should be recognized in the current period of approximately 72.2 million yuan, resulting in a net profit in the 2007 annual report. 50 million yuan loss, specific data will be disclosed in the 2007 annual report. The 2007 annual report formally disclosed showed a loss of 33.9 million yuan. If there is no excessive dividend, the company will not lose money in that year.
* ST Yinyi, which is deeply affected by the funds and debts of major shareholders, is the latest example.
* ST Yinyi disclosed on July 11 that due to the difficulty in capital turnover, its corporate bond "16 Yinyi 05" failed to be paid on schedule, involving about 400 million yuan in principal and 28.18 million yuan in interest. Prior to June 21, the company's "16 silver billion 05" and "15 silver billion 01" have successively defaulted, involving a principal of 522 million yuan and 299 million yuan.
But just in April 2018, * ST Yinyi claimed to return to investors in the name of "high-end manufacturing + real estate" dual-main industry industry characteristics, and the company's current and subsequent profitability and profitability level, and proposed 4.027 billion shares The total share capital is based on a cash dividend of RMB 7 for every 10 shares and a total cash dividend of RMB 2.919 billion.
However, * ST Yinyi was not optimistic at the time. In 2017, the company achieved a net profit of 1.601 billion yuan, but only 580 million yuan after deductions. The above-mentioned dividend amount is equivalent to about 1.66 times the net profit for the year and nearly 4.9 times the non-net profit. In 2015 and 2016, the company's net profit was only 682 million yuan and 527 million yuan. A dividend pays off all the profits of the past year.
At the same time, * ST Yinyi's capital is not generous. As of the end of 2017, its monetary fund balance was 4.138 billion yuan, short-term loans alone reached 2.762 billion yuan, and long-term loans due within one year were 2.744 billion yuan. The first quarterly report for 2018 shows that as of the end of March 2018, the company's monetary fund balance was 3.877 billion yuan, and short-term borrowings were 2.36 billion yuan. There was obvious pressure on debt service.
Most of the large cash dividends went into the pockets of major shareholders. In 2017, the actual controller of * ST Yinyi increased its shareholding ratio from 66.13% in 2016 to 77.85% at the end of 2017. More than 2.1 billion yuan of cash dividends flowed into the hands of major shareholders.
Prior to this, the funding of * ST Yinyi's major shareholders was very tight. The announcement shows that from January 23 to the end of April 2018, major shareholders and their concerted parties carried out more than ten equity pledges and re-pledges after disbursement.
Before major shareholders increased their shareholding, * ST Yinyi cash dividends were not much. Among them, the 2016 dividend was 0.21 yuan per 10 shares, and the total amount of dividends was only 64.22 million yuan. In 2015, except for 20 shares for every 10 shares in the middle of the year, no cash dividends were made throughout the year.